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IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL ANTI-BRIBERY NORMS 5 shifted to establishing a competitive "level playing field" for all business globally.
1
Rather than abolish the FCPA when facing unfair bribe-based competition from abroad, influential US business leaders of the 1980s era sought to extend anti-bribery norms to their non-US competitors.
22 A cynic might view the effort to extend anti-corruption norms rather than reduce them as realpolitik, recognition that norms tend to be sticky; few politicians want to be caught voting to protect bribery.
However, the facts show that Mr. Heimann, General Electric's General Counsel-a leader in the US Chamber of Commerce-was also a founding member of the US chapter of Transparency International, the early leading non-governmental organization challenging global corruption. 23 His active work for Transparency International continued long after he retired from General Electric.
2 4 Apparently, some American business leaders of that era believed that global anti-corruption norms were in their best business interests as well as morally correct. Concern about unfair competition by non-US businesses permitted to bribe abroad (and in some cases to deduct foreign but of course not domestic bribeS 26 ) was a normative approach gaining momentum in the United States. This shift in emphasis might be viewed as the origins of effective globalization of FCPA norms of morality and efficient competitive free markets as described by the 1977 House Report.
The 1988 Amendments to the FCPA directed the US Executive Branch to negotiate with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") 27 for an anti-bribery convention binding all OECD member states. 28 (The OECD is a multi-lateral organization including 496 (2000) almost all the most economically powerful nations.29) Two US administrations attempted to convince major OECD economic powers such as the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, France, and Germany to adopt an anti-bribery convention. 3 0 The negotiation strategies employed by President George Herbert Walker Bush (Republican) and President Bill Clinton (Democrat) are amusing as well as notable.
A series of domestic political corruption scandals in Europe, combined with the Clinton administration's hardball tactics (reportedly threatening to disclose to the press names of OECD nation's corporations as the world's top bribe payers 3 1 ) eventually led to the adoption of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1998. 32 The normative discussion also broadened during the Clinton administration. In addition to general morality, appeals to rational, competitive free markets, and leveling the playing field for global business, by 1998 the discourse expanded to include two additional normsdevelopment economics and respect for local (foreign) law.
C. Democracy and Development
The fourth normative justification for globalizing FCPA values by 1998 included economic development, 33 apparently influenced by the US Department of State. 34 Economic research correlating bribery with adverse 6 [Vol. 23:1 impact on democracies by undermining economic development was now included in the debate. 35 The democracy and development norm has since become standard in FCPA discussions added to the earlier norms of morality, free competitive markets, and a level playing field for global trade. 36 The democracy and development norms evolved during the 1970s and 1980s led by World Bank economists. During the 1960s and 1970s, most multi-lateral development agencies, as well as researchers, avoided the embarrassing topic of corruption in developing economies.
38 After a series of project failures, particularly in Africa, in 1983 the World Bank established a unit on governance.
3 9 The World Bank's Legal Department of that era objected to what they viewed as potential political interference; 40 the projects were cast in more politically neutral terms of "managerial capacities." 41 From 1990 to 1996, the unacceptable rate of investment failure, especially in Africa, and increasing pressure from donors for governance reform contributed to enhance focus on corruption problems among foreign officials.
4 2 "In October 1996, World Bank President James Wolfensohn set new precedents by speaking out against the 'the cancer of corruption."' 43 The World Bank's focus initially emphasized governance reforms on the demand side; by 2002 the Bank began to substantially strengthen debarment sanctions for supply side bribe payers.
Another early major leader in articulating the negative impacts of corruption on economic development is the leading anti-bribery nongovernmental organization, Transparency International ("TI"). TI was global trading powers. The House Report itself states that less corruption makes a nation more attractive for foreign investment, as does the Executive branch, which termed it a strategic and economic imperative. 
founded in 1993 by Peter Eigen, 4 5 who saw the direct damage to local people done by corruption. While working for the World Bank in Africa, Eigen observed overpriced, unnecessary and damaging (so-called white elephant) projects designed to maximize rent-seeking (bribery) opportunities for corrupt local officials, which then increased the national debt of the looted and increasingly impoverished developing nation. 4 Eigen left the World Bank to found Transparency International, originally based in Hamburg, Germany. In 1995, an intern at TI, Johan Graf Lambsdorff, 47 developed a corruption perceptions index, which accidentally leaked to Der Spiegel, 4 8 eventually becoming the influential and controversial Corruption Perceptions Index ("CPI") ranking the perception of various nations' propensity for corruption (demanding bribes). 49 In 1999, TI began publishing the Bribe Payers Index ("BPI"), which ranked nations' multi-national corporations propensity for paying bribes to obtain business abroad.so
D. Respect for Local (Foreign) Law
Although democracy and development norms became widely known and discussed during the 1990s, a fifth norm -respect for local (foreign) sovereigns -also emerged during the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA. Often overlooked in FCPA debates, the local law provision embodies a crucial norm about respect for foreign sovereigns. If the payment, gift, or hospitality was "lawful under the written laws" of the receiving official's state, it does not constitute a criminal bribe under the FCPA. 5 The FCPA's local law provision establishes normative diversity regarding which transactions are classified as illegal "bribes" and which are classified as permissible "gifts." 5 2 Rather than imposing a one-size-fits-all US definition of "bribe" versus "gift," the FCPA places the power to define an acceptable gift in the hands of the local (foreign) legal system. Many nations have extensive, transparent written laws and regulations governing gifts to and entertainment of local officials." The local law provision provides global traders with a safer path to building relationships with foreign officials: Obey the local laws. Providing legal advice regarding local gifts and hospitality laws around the world has become an important compliance service offered by a variety of vendors.
56
The provision is hard due to recognition in US criminal law of the diversity of values around the world regarding legitimate gifts and hospitality. The local law provision rebuts the charge that the FCPA is a form of US moral imperialism imposing its naive values on hapless sovereigns abroad. The value choices at all times remain with local (foreign) sovereigns to define acceptable gifts and hospitality for their officials.
The US statute merely gives comity -legal respect to the foreign local laws. The truly remarkable act of permitting foreign sovereigns to define criminal law and domestic US tax treatment of gift and hospitality payments is international comity at a very high level. 57 (Similar language was incorporated in the OECD Convention, Commentaries 7 and 8, and explicitly in the domestic laws of several OECD member states.")
E. Human Rights and the Rule ofLaw
More recently a sixth norm emerged. As a global grassroots movement against corruption appears to be taking root, President Barack Obama in 2010 described corruption as "a profound violation of human rights." 5 When kleptocratic elites give and take bribes with impunity, the Although the articulation of values has evolved over the thirty-five years of the FCPA, the American commitment to challenging corruption abroad as well as at home has not often wavered. 6 While partisan battles are often very sharp, both Republican and Democratic administrations from President Gerald Ford (R) and President George W. Bush (R) to President Jimmy Carter (D) and President Barack Obama (D) have consistently committed their administrations to combatting bribery abroad. President Herbert Walker Bush (R) tried valiantly to overcome the resistance of our allies, and President Bill Clinton (D) succeeded in negotiating the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Opposing bribery, at home and abroad, is a fundamental, shared, non-partisan American value supporting a relatively consistent domestic economic and foreign policy strategy over thirty-five tumultuous years.
The FCPA model focuses solely on the supply side bribe payers. By disciplining our own influential US corporate citizens (corrupt bribe payers) first, rather than preaching at bribe takers (corrupt foreign officials), the FCPA is a classic example of walking the walk rather than just talking the talk.
64
Taking on the political, legal, and economic burden of changing what have been highly profitable bribery based business models for some of the most powerful economic actors in human history -US-based multinational corporations -has been no small task. Americans can be justly proud of our efforts. 
A. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Enforcement
Explicitly modeled on the FCPA, the 1998 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention ("OECD Convention") is widely recognized as a landmark accomplishment in anti-bribery law reform. The OECD Convention requires signatory states to ban paying bribes (often described as supply side, or active bribery) to foreign officials to do business abroad. The Convention itself, like the FCPA, does not address receiving bribes (sometimes described as demand side or passive bribery discussed below in Section III). Germany led with its dramatic prosecution of Siemens (including dawn raids on Siemens' offices and homes of senior executives) 80 in cooperation with the US Department of Justice.
8 1 France referred a major bribery scandal involving several multi-national oil companies doing business in Nigeria to the United States as well as prosecuted its own French oil company (Elf-Aquitaine, now Total). 82 The United Kingdom, which had suffered a very embarrassing initial failure to prosecute BAE bribery of Saudi royal family members due to political interference by then Prime Minister Tony Blair, was able to eventually sanction although not debar BAE in cooperation with the United States. In his sentencing opinion, UK Lord Justice Thomas termed the penalties agreed to between Innospec and the US Department of Justice "wholly inadequate" in light of the serious crimes Innospec committed."' The financial penalties were relatively low because the firm faced insolvency, a justification Lord Justice Thomas found not sufficient, but in the interests of cooperation in the joint prosecution, he deferred to the US settlement terms."12 A second case of potential US enforcement weakness is the notorious Kazakhstan bribery case involving millions of dollars, furs, jewelry, and jet skis allegedly given in return for oil and gas contracts."
3 After a seven-year effort to prosecute alleged bagman New York lawyer James Giffen, the case ended in 2010 with Giffen pleading to a misdemeanor tax charge, apparently after the Central Intelligence Agency refused to turn over documents in the case. 
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are not influenced by foreign policy considerations. 120 The Giffen debacle may be an isolated failure, but real harm nevertheless is done to the idea of the rule of law: a neutral, professional, and independent legal system in the United States.
While the US judicial system has historically been relatively weak in general when faced with executive branch foreign policy or national security claims, 12 1 in the bribery law reform context the consequences of this weakness are potentially significant. In the battle for hearts and minds, the effort to develop globally shared normative values that bribery is a crime and should be punished by law, exceptions for the rich and famous, for the influential and well-connected, and for those with large oil reserves are especially damaging.
The normative power of the anti-corruption reform effort is fundamentally one of fairness: equal justice under law. Criminal law applies not only to the poor, but to the rich and well-connected. This fundamental policy is undermined by exceptions based on economic advantage such as Kazakh or Saudi oil reserves.
Because of the negative impact on the credibility and legitimacy of bribery law enforcement, and in light of the understandable cynicism of those who have experienced repeated, ineffective domestic corruption crackdowns in nations such as China, Russia, Brazil, and India, the issue of politicized prosecutions is now central. This is especially true in nations where anti-corruption crackdowns have been used domestically as a tool of political discipline to punish political opponents while corruption of political allies goes unpunished.
As global anti-bribery enforcement efforts enter their second decade, potential problems of selective prosecutions, failure to prosecute, or underprosecution because of political or economic advantage in violation of the OECD Convention Article 5 are the most important issues to watch. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Benjamin Billa have an important article analyzing this issue in the context of the UK's BAE/Saudi problem.1 2 2 Mclean's quantitative analysis of the actual data is an invaluable tool to ensure that prosecutions go "where the evidence takes them" in a professional, politically neutral manner.
123
The OECD Working Group is highly competent and well situated to monitor Article 5 problems should they arise. In addition, enforcement cooperation between OECD Convention states is tempered by enforcement competition, including both assistance (as in the BAE prosecutions) and transparent criticism (as in the Innospec cases).
The SEC adopted strict new transparency rules regulating payments by oil and gas companies and others in extraction mining industries in August 2012.124 The European Union is expected to follow soon. 125 Canada, which itself has substantial natural resources, may also consider regulations requiring transparent payments. 
C. The Future of Supply Side Enforcement
With the ratification of the UK Bribery Act, the US FCPA is no Although the raw number of lagging enforcement nations is high, most of them with the exception of Brazil ("little enforcement") are relatively smaller economies. In terms of percentage of world exports, nineteen nations comprising fifty-three percent of world exports are classified as active or moderate enforcers as of 2012.138 This is up slightly from the 2011 report.
139 It is also important to note that raw counts of cases prosecuted may not reflect enforcement effectiveness if states are pursuing very complex grand corruption bribery cases.
Where one nation proves unable or unwilling to enforce anti-bribery laws against favored national champion corporations (in violation of Article 5's prohibition against political or economic favoritism in prosecutions), other nations can and do step up.1 40 Enforcing against 'foreign'l 4 1 multinationals is not only possible but now relatively frequent under the OECD Convention. IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL ANTI-BRIBERY NORMS field against unfair competition from those continuing to cling to old bribeabroad business models. In the event that enforcement competition proves insufficient to change bribe-abroad business models, debarment remedies which have to date been relatively under-deployed, appear to be coming to the forefront. The much-touted mandatory debarment sanction of the European Union has yet to be deployed frequentlyl 4 6 as plea agreements may be carefully structured to avoid it.1 4 7 The US debarment process is not especially effective at this point in time.1 4 8 Serious debarment action currently seems to be from the multi-lateral lending banks.
The World Bank, in particular, appears to be effectively increasing the likelihood of debarment sanctions against contractors for paying bribes.
14 9 The World Bank's Sanctions Regime adopted its current two- The multi-pronged supply side enforcement strategy of the FCPA, with the new SEC Extractive Industries transparency regulations, and OECD Convention cooperative and competitive enforcement by thirty-nine economic powers, augmented by increased potential for debarment from the World Bank and the Regional Development Banks, have real potential to reduce both the frequency and the amounts of bribery abroad over time.
As loopholes are shut on the supply side for bribe payers, threats from corrupt foreign officials demanding bribes become increasingly empty. "Bribe me or I'll take my country's business elsewhere" is an empty threat if there is nowhere else to take their corrupt demands. Selling out your country for personal gain becomes more difficult when there are fewer buyers. One frequent criticism of both the US FCPA and the OECD AntiBribery Convention is that unlike the new UK Bribery Act,' 58 neither of the older legal regimes address the demand side of bribery transactions (corrupt foreign officials taking bribes is sometimes also termed 'passive' bribery). 59 Business people frequently view demands from officials for payments, gifts, and hospitality as a form of 'extortion'1 6 0 and view themselves as victims twice over -once from a greedy foreign official and a second time from prosecutors in their home state. It seems deeply unfair that bribe payers go to jail, while bribe receivers continue their crimes with impunity, enjoying lavish lifestyles with the proceeds of their crimes.
The cross-debarment agreement includes the
The term 'extortion' has a very specific legal meaning under both the US FCPA and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 'Extortion' under current US FCPA law does not extend to threats to economic or business advantage (pay me or I'll take my business elsewhere); under current US FCPA law, true extortion is limited to threats of violence (pay me or I'll blow up your oil rig).161 Commentary 7 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention also specifically excludes defenses based on threats to business advantage.1 6 2 This is a very important legal distinction as Russia enters the OECD Convention because older Soviet-style legal systems often permitted bribery defenses based on economic or business threats, while the US and 158. Jordan, supra note 131, at 864. 159. Sometimes, of course, the official taking bribes is not passive at all; he or she is demanding and perhaps even threatening unless bribes are paid. Sometimes, of course, the bribe payer is initiating and pushing the corrupt payment on a foreign official. 
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OECD systems limit extortion defenses to threats of violence.
The frustration that enforcement is focused primarily on the supply side of bribe payers is shared by multi-national corporations as well as exploited local people directly suffering under systemically corrupted regimes. There is some reason to hope that increasing global supply side enforcement against bribe payers has now set the stage for serious enforcement efforts on the demand side of corrupt officials.
A. US Enforcement Against Demand Side Bribe Takers
Domestic US law provides limited avenues for addressing demandside crimes where the official is foreign. Although the FCPA itself does not assert jurisdiction over corrupt foreign officials taking bribes, the United States recently used money laundering criminal statutes to reach three foreign government official bribe takers and their assets in the Haiti With the primary focus on the demand side -public officials soliciting or accepting bribes -the IACAC statement of norms differs in emphasis from the FCPA. Where the FCPA emphasis is on global competition, the IACAC emphasizes economic development, which is particularly undermined by organized crime, especially in illicit narcotics.1 90 While the FCPA focuses on preventing deep-pocket global traders from paying bribes, the IACAC focuses on preventing public officials from soliciting bribes, and on recovering the proceeds of crime.
The IACAC is implemented through a follow-up mechanism known as MESICIC.1 9 ' Although MESICIC has official documents and materials available in English on its well-organized website, there is little independent research and analysis available from legal scholars. It would be exceptionally helpful as the global anti-corruption legal scholarship develops if legal scholars fluent in Spanish and Portuguese would research domestic implementation efforts of several of the IACAC provisions, including Article IX (Illicit Enrichment), Articles XV (Asset Recovery), and Article XVI (Bank Secrecy).
Because the IACAC is the oldest convention with these provisions, it has the most experience in implementation. Sharing information about the successes and failures, especially for provisions implementing disclosure of public officials' assets, and asset recovery will be very helpful for other nations under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (see discussion below).
Other regional anti-corruption conventions were also adopted focusing on both supply-and demand-side bribery. The European Union adopted extensive anti-corruption provisions during the 1990s and the EU has very able legal scholars who are better situated than I to analyze them.1 9 2 The African Union also adopted a regional anti-corruption convention coming into force in 2006, which has also been extensively 
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C. Multi-Lateral Efforts to Combat Demand Side Corruption: the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
While the IACAC was the first and served as a model, the real globalization of the movement to address demand-side corruption came through the United Nations Convention Against Corruption ("UNCAC"), which entered into force in 2005. 194 As of December 2012, there are 165 States Parties and 140 Signatories to the UNCAC.' 9 s The UN Convention addresses five topics: prevention, criminalization and law enforcement measures, international cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance and information exchange. Various forms of corruption such as trading in influence, abuse of power, and various acts of corruption in the private sector are also addressed.
In September, 2011, the UNCAC launched a sophisticated website with a searchable electronic database of corruption-related legislation and jurisprudence for over 175 countries. 196 "TRACK", the acronym for Tools and Resources for Anti-Corruption Knowledge, will greatly facilitate independent analysis of the progress in law reforms under UNCAC. The TRACK database permits searches by country, by Convention Article topic, by type of legal system, and by governance structure. TRACK also provides research and sharing information for anti-corruption practitioners, including enforcement agencies.' role of anti-corruption norms in grassroots movements is rising; increasingly, they are seen as fundamental rights. 99 Recovery of assets is a major concern for UNCAC countries pursuing the assets of former leaders and other officials accused of or found to have engaged in corruption. In cooperation with the World Bank, the StAR asset recovery project was launched, providing technical expertise to nations seeking to recover looted assets.200 The OECD and StAR issued an important joint report in March 2012 on identification and quantification of the proceeds of bribery. 20 1 Asset recovery is, in my opinion, the most exciting area currently developing in global anti-corruption reforms on the demand (passive) side.
IV. CONCLUSION
On the supply side, enforcement cooperation and competition among OECD Convention nations disciplining multi-national bribe payers appears to be highly effective. On the demand side, anti-money laundering law enforcement and facilitating asset recovery of bribe revenues as well as embezzled state assets will provide an economic incentive to reform systemically corrupted nations. If corrupt officials cannot safely stash their loot in First World banks, stocks, or real estate to ensure a comfortable lifestyle exit strategy for themselves, their family and friends, it may encourage legitimate rather than corrupt wealth acquisition. At least it will make it more difficult and risky for corrupt bribe takers and their clans to enjoy the stolen loot in desirable locations abroad.
Although thirty-five years may seem painfully slow, in comparison to other major global law reforms of profitable but unacceptable business models, it seems to be on track. The abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, a highly profitable business model, took about sixty years with Britain and especially the British Navy leading virtually alone while other nations, including the US and Brazil, lagged in enforcement until the very 
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